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The 1990 Uniform Probate Code: Older
and Better, or More like the Internal
Revenue Code?
Mark L. Ascher*
For more than a decade, I have taught Estates & Trusts in
Arizona, one of the relatively few states to have adopted the
Uniform Probate Code (UPC).1 During that time, I have grown
quite fond of the pre-1990 version of the UPC.2 It is a model of
clear and concise drafting.3 Its distaste for estate planning esoterica4 marks it as distinctly "consumer friendly." Its sure and
sensible handling of issues that otherwise would have generated litigation5 evidences thorough common sense. As one who
also teaches Tax, I have jealously guarded the opportunity to
continue teaching my UPC course, for the welcome relief it has
provided from the Internal Revenue Code's statutory pollution,
esoteric vocabulary, and litigation incentives.
I expected the 1990 revisions to make the UPC even better.
I am not sure they have. The 1990 version lacks several of the
* Professor of Law, University of Arizona College of Law. B.A., 1975,
Marquette University; M.A., 1977, Kansas State University; J.D., 1978, Harvard
Law School; LL.M. (in Taxation), 1981, New York University. I wish to thank
my colleagues, Arthur Andrews, Charles Ares, Leslie Espinoza, Ted Schneyer,
John Strong, and Willard Van Slyck, for comments on prior drafts of this
article.
1. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-1101 to 14-7307 (1975). Only 15 states
have adopted the UPC. UNIF. PROBATE CODE, 8 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1992).
2. The "pre-1990 version" of UPC Article II was originally promulgated
in 1969, and last amended in 1987. The "1990 version" of Article II represented a significant revision of the old article, and was itself amended in 1991.
For clarity, this article will cite to the old Article IHas "PRE-1990 UNIF. PROBATE CODE" and the new Article H as "1990 UNIF. PROBATE CODE," omitting
information about the provisions' subsequent revision or amendment.
3. See, e.g., PRE-1990 UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-605 (the antilapse statute), 2-608 (providing for exceptions to ademption).

4. See, e.g., id. §§ 2-302 (minimizing claims of pretermitted children), 2502 (liberalizing presence requirements for will execution), 2-503 (liberalizing
holograph requirements), 2-505 (liberalizing witness requirements), 4-201 to 4207 (minimizing need for ancillary probate).
5. See, e.g., id. §§ 2-110 (minimizing advancements), 2-504 (providing for
self-proved wills), 2-612 (minimizing satisfactions).
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pre-1990 version's most endearing characteristics. The 1990 version is much less clear and much wordier. Several of the new
statutory contortions are distinctly more complex than anything in the old version.6 To be blunt, the 1990 version is also
quite pretentious. In contrast to the pre-1990 version, which
was content to provide practical and workable solutions to most
of the biggest problems most of the time, the 1990 version apparently believes that it can and must solve all probate (and related) problems, however small, all the time. This compulsion
to deal individually with every conceivable variation 7 serves not
just to explain why the 1990 version is so complex and wordy.
It also helps to explain the 1990 version's willingness to resort
to litigation to resolve issues the pre-1990 version was willing to
resolve in more summary fashion.
In addition, the 1990 version of the UPC seems to have a
different ideology from that of the old statute. The notes accompanying the 1990 revision identify, as a central "theme," the
need better to effectuate a decedent's intent.8 Accordingly, the
1990 version frequently specifies outcomes that depend explicitly upon the decedent's intention (as opposed to what the controlling document says), which, in turn, is ascertainable (if at
all) only upon analysis of all the facts and circumstances. 9
Effectuation of a decedent's intent seems to have served as
the revisers' primary compass. I have argued elsewhere, and in
a different context, that society ought to care less about how
6. The antilapse statute in the 1990 version of the UPC takes up 99 lines
of text; that in the pre-1990 version took up only 11. In addition, the 1990 version consumes 259 more lines to project the antilapse statute into new areas.
Compare 1990 UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-603, 2-706, 2-707 with PRE-1990 UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-605. The new provisions relating to the surviving spouse's
elective share are even more breathtakingly resplendent in statutory verbiage.
They occupy 467 lines; those in the pre-1990 version occupied only 176. Cornpare 1990 UNiF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201 to 2-207 with PRE-1990 UNIF. PROBATE
CODE §§ 2-201 to 2-207. There ought to be a law against this type of statutory
pollution.
7. See, e.g., 1990 UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-102 (spousal intestate succession scheme taking more variables into account), 2-106 (redefining and complicating representation).
8. See id. art. II, pref. note (recognizing "the decline of formalism in
favor of intent-serving policies").
9. See, e.g., id. §§ 2-601 (rules of construction apply in absence of a "finding of a contrary intention"), 2-603(b)(3) (words requiring survival do not
render antilapse statute inapplicable unless there is "additional evidence" of
"an intent contrary to the application of this section"), 2-606(a)(6) ("unless the
facts and circumstances indicate that ademption of the devise was intended by
the testator or ademption of the devise is consistent with the testator's manifested plan of distribution," ademption cannot occur).
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the dead want their wealth used than how the living want to
use it.1° Consistent with that belief, I would prefer to see the
UPC pay more attention to "living" values, such as simplicity
and certainty, than to "dead" values, such as incremental improvements in effectuating a decedent's intent. I am less interested in a system that seeks to carry out a decedent's intent
(particularly where the decedent has never bothered to express
that intent) than in a system that simply and without litigation
disposes of a decedent's assets. Moreover, I am convinced that
in many instances, triers of fact have nothing of value to say
about an intention the decedent has never expressed and probably never even had. It is ironic, in a field of law so riddled with
rules whose primary effect has always been the frustration of
decedents' expressed intentions,"1 that the 1990 version of the
UPC would strain so hard to effectuate intentions that decedents have left unepressed--and in particular, that it would
2
strain to do so with respect to comparatively trivial matters.
In seeking to implement the often unexpressed intent of decedents, the 1990 version invites litigation concerning many more
issues than the pre-1990 version did.
In short, as a result of the 1990 revisions, the UPC has
come to resemble the Internal Revenue Code. Part of me
therefore wants to write a stinging indictment of the 1990 revisions. This short essay is not that indictment. And I may
never get around to writing one, for I genuinely like the effect
of many of the 1990 revisions.' 3 Many, indeed most, of the 1990
10. Mark L. Ascher, CurtailingInherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69
(1990) (arguing generally that property rights should end at death).
11. Examples of such rules include the Statute of Wills, the allowance in
lieu of homestead, provisions dealing with exempt property, the family allowance, the surviving spouse's elective share, provisions for omitted spouses and
pretermitted children, the rules relating to testamentary capacity and undue
influence, and continue on and on.
12. For example, while reversing the traditional rule relating to ademption, apparently in an effort better to effectuate the unexpressed intent of the
"average" testator, see 1990 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-606(a)(5)-(6), the 1990
version of the UPC continues utterly to disregard the intent of those who die
intestate, except, occasionally, with respect to advancements. See id. § 2109(a). Yet intestates, just as those who have the inclination, leisure, and financial means to leave a will, may have formulated, and even expressed to
others, clear and provable ideas about how their assets should pass after death.
13. For example, the effect of the 1990 revisions dealing with the surviving spouse's elective share is distinctly superior to that of the pre-1990 version.
Compare id. §§ 2-201 to 2-207 with PRE-1990 UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201 to
2-207. I have advocated a somewhat similar approach in a different context.
See Ascher, supra note 10, at 123-26 (discussing marital exceptions to a proposed abolition of inheritance). Likewise, it probably is time to start moving
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revisions are worthy of enactment. They address widely recognized problems and dispose of them sensibly. There are, however, other portions of the 1990 version with which I take
strong exception.
This essay discusses two particularly troublesome provisions of the 1990 version of the UPC. One is the reversal of the
general rule relating to ademption. The other is the determination that words requiring survival are insufficient to render the
antilapse statute inapplicable. Both revisions reveal an excessive concern for the decedent's unexpressed intent. Worse,
both involve areas in which there is likely to be no real evidence, from any source, regarding the decedent's intent. Moreover, both issues are of trivial significance on any comparative
basis. On each of these grounds, both revisions are vulnerable.
So, however, are many other of the 1990 revisions. What distinguishes these two changes is that both require that competent
and conscientious estate planners advise many of their clients
to rewrite their wills, purely to settle statutory ambiguities.
That is a terribly expensive price for a tiny increase in faithfulness to what the revisers imagine is the "average" testator's unexpressed intent. It is a price the revisers should not impose on
this nation's testators.
As a general rule, any time a statute dealing with something as mundane as probate becomes more difficult to understand, the improvement is dubious. Whenever legislation
makes it harder for a lay person to understand the words an estate planner has chosen on his or her behalf, we all should ask
whether meaningful reform has occurred. Everyone in the estate planning community has reason to be disheartened by estate litigation, for, with few exceptions, behind every litigating
estate is an estate planner or a probate rule that has failed to
do its job properly. Legislation that forces large numbers of clients to redo their estate plans is, at least to that extent, manifestly inefficient and unfair. These are all truisms the revisers
of the UPC should have constantly in mind. Instead, the UPC
seems to have become a laboratory for academicians bent on
reaching, at any cost, what they imagine to be the "correct" result. Those who revise the UPC should never forget that estate
planners and lay people must live under, and pay the costs of
implementing, their work product.
The thoughtful reader at this point may be tempted to acthis country away from a highly formalistic Statute of Wills. If so, 1990 UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-503 is certainly appropriate.
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cuse me of growling menacingly only to slink silently into the
shadows. I hope to do more than pick nits, however. The two
examples I discuss here exemplify all that is bad in the 1990
version of the UPC. Both revisions result in increased statutory complexity. Both place a premium on estate planning esoterica. Both openly encourage litigation. Thus, both revisions
illustrate the general drift of the 1990 version away from the
virtues of the pre-1990 version and toward the vices of the Internal Revenue Code. In addition, both changes require estate
planners to review almost all currently existing wills. To that
extent, the revisers have exhibited the same callous indifference Congress all too often displays in amending the Internal
Revenue Code. In criticizing these two revisions, I may be
picking nits. But I am picking nits that illustrate a significant
change in the UPC's ideological direction. In criticizing these
two revisions I am, therefore, arguing against that ideological
change as well.
I.

ADEMPTION

Under traditional notions of ademption, if at death a testator no longer owns property that is the subject of a specific bequest, the beneficiary of that bequest takes nothing.' 4 It
requires no particular acumen to see that this rule has the potential to frustrate a testator's intent.' 5 Not every testator who
sells specifically bequeathed property immediately recognizes
that the sale may have affected his or her will. Therefore,
ademption may occur without the testator ever having considered the matter. Even if a testator does make the mental connection, there may not be the time, inclination, or wherewithal
to consult a lawyer before death. And even with fair access to a
lawyer, the testator may assume that the sales proceeds somehow pass to the specific beneficiary in lieu of the item in question. In any of these eventualities, ademption may frustrate
the testator's intent.
Or it may not. Ademption is not a doctrine developed by a
devious demon purely to frustrate testators' intent. It reflects
the assumption, which the revisers apparently reject, that elimination of a specific bequest when the underlying asset disap14.

See generally THOMAS E. ATINsON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS

§ 134 (2d ed. 1953).
15. See, e.g., In re Estate of Nakoneczny, 319 A.2d 893, 895-96 (Pa. 1974)
(noting that ademption is "an inflexible rule of law.., not founded on any
presumed intention of the testator").
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pears is what most testators want. Most specific bequests are
not efforts to divide wealth quantitatively among competing
beneficiaries, each of whom is similarly situated in the testator's affection and concern. In fact, competent estate planners
generally try to avoid using specific bequests when the testator's real desire is simply to allocate quantities of wealth among
a group of individuals. General bequests and fractional shares
of the residuary estate are much more apt for implementing
such dispositive goals. Instead, a well-conceived specific bequest generally reflects a testator's wish that a particular item
pass to a particular individual. Thus, the "average" well-counseled testator almost certainly prefers that each specific bequest disappear with the asset bequeathed.
A testator often leaves a specific bequest because he or she
believes that a particular beneficiary has a particular desire for
or familiarity with a particular asset. Such a testator makes
the bequest not as an "equalizing devise, 1 6 but because of a
particular beneficiary's relationship to a particular asset. If the
asset disappears, there is no reason to conclude that the testator
would want the proceeds to pass to that beneficiary.
In other situations, the asset itself, rather than a specific
beneficiary, is at the center of the testator's affections. The testator's real goal is to protect that asset by bequeathing it to
someone the testator believes will care for it particularly well
or cherish it especially highly. Perhaps the clearest example is
a bequest of a pet. A testator may leave a favorite pet to someone he or she believes will provide the pet with affection and
reliable care. Bequests of jewelry, antiques, paintings, old
sports cars, guns, farms, and interests in closely-held businesses
often arise out of similar motives. A testator who makes such a
bequest may care less about who benefits from the asset than
who is most likely to use the asset in the way the testator
thinks appropriate. If the testator disposes of the asset in question, it is absurd to think that the testator would want the pro16. These are words from the revisers' comment to 1990 UNnF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-606. They, better than anything else in the revisers' notes, reveal
what is apparently one of the revisers' primary assumptions. The revisers apparently view specific bequests as tools for shifting definable quantities of
wealth among a cast of competing beneficiaries. Obviously, testators sometimes do so employ specific bequests. But there are other functions of specific
bequests, in which the allocation of quantities of wealth plays little, if any,
role. Instead, the relationship of an individual beneficiary to a particular piece
of property, or the testator's desire to preserve a particular piece of property,
may be the primary or even exclusive reason for the bequest.
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ceeds to pass to an individual selected solely on the basis of
fitness to care for a now-missing asset.
The pre-1990 version of the UPC followed the traditional
ademption rule but carved out four very limited exceptions.' 7
These exceptions recognized that ademption might or might
not accord with a testator's intention, but their limited nature
suggested a willingness to depart from the traditional rule only
in the clearest circumstances. Unpaid sales proceeds, unpaid
condemnation awards, and unpaid fire or casualty insurance
passed to the specific beneficiary, as did property taken in (or
in lieu of) foreclosure of the security for a specifically devised
obligation.' 8 The pre-1990 version of the UPC thus insisted on
the clearest sort of tracing in its first baby steps away from the
identity theory of ademption. It takes no hardcore advocate of
effectuating a testator's unexpressed intent to suggest that the
UPC could have taken more, bigger, and quicker steps away
from the identity theory. But fashioning equally limited and
thoughtful additional exceptions is not the route the revisers
have chosen. Instead, the revisers have basically turned the
rule on its head, though without the kind of forthright drafting
one might have expected. 19
The revisers have added a fifth "exception" that deals,
broadly, with real or tangible personal property. If a decedent
at death owns "real or tangible personal property" that he or
she has "acquired as a replacement for specifically devised real
or tangible personal property," the replacement property passes
to the specific beneficiary. 20 The revisers encourage us to see
in this fifth "exception" "a sensible 'mere change in form' principle." 2 ' They illustrate this "principle" with an example,
which begins with a bequest of "my 1984 Ford." After execution of the will, the testator sells the Ford and buys a 1988 Buick. Later, she sells the Buick and buys a 1993 Chrysler. The
17. PRE-1990 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-608(a). In addition, there was an
exception for assets disposed of by a conservator. Id. § 2-608(b).
18. Id § 2-608(a).
19. The revisers' drafting reminds me of Congress' most recent major
amendment of I.R.C. § 2035. I.R.C. § 2035 requires inclusion of certain gifts
within three years of death in "gross estate" for purposes of the federal estate
tax. I.R.C. § 2035(a) (1988). Instead of forthrightly reversing the old rule by
repealing § 2035(a), Congress in 1981 added a new subsection, § 2035(d), which,
in § 2035(d)(1), purported to repeal § 2035(a) but, in § 2035(d)(2), retained it
for a few purposes. Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34,
§ 424(a), 95 Stat. 172 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 2035(d)(1)-(2)).
20. 1990 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-606(a)(5) (emphasis added).
21. Id § 2-606 cmt.
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revisers opine that the 1993 Chrysler, as a replacement for the
1984 Ford, passes to the specific beneficiary. 22 I find this example troubling. Assume that the testator signed her will in 1988,
when the Ford was well-used and badly-dented and its value
was less than half its cost. In addition, assume that though the
testator had fully paid for the Chrysler, and though the title
had already been issued in her name, she died prior to picking
up the car. Allowing the specific beneficiary to take a brandnew luxury car in lieu of a worn-out and beat-up economy car
does not seem to me to be an intuitively obviously better result
than ademption.
If I vary the fact pattern a little more, the fifth "exception"
makes me even more uncomfortable. Assume that the third
car is a 1926 Rolls Royce Phantom. The cost of the Rolls is approximately thirty times the value of the used Ford. Assume
also that the testator bought the Rolls as her daily driver (and
some people do buy expensive classics as daily drivers), in substitution for the Buick that replaced the Ford. Unless the revisers plan to slide off their slippery slope at this point by
emphasizing the first word of their "sensible 'mere change in
form' principle," the Rolls would apparently pass to the lucky
beneficiary of the used Ford. Is this statutory improvement or
an invitation to litigation that resembles legalized gambling?
One of the facts that these examples reflect is that "replacement" has no meaning well enough defined to merit its selection as the talisman of ademption. 23 In states that adopt the
fifth "exception" to ademption, therefore, we can expect a flood
of litigation over the meaning of "replacement." That is a high
price to pay for a small improvement in faithfulness to the unexpressed intention of the testator.
I have even stronger reservations about the sixth "excep22. Id.
23. If even the example involving the 1926 Rolls Royce fails to make the
revisers squirm, surely there are other examples that will. Say that the testator from the previous examples, upon becoming unable to drive, replaces the
Buick with an electric cart, with which she thereafter runs errands in her retirement community. Both the Buick and the electric cart were, while the testator owned them, her only form of transportation. Does the electric cart pass
to the beneficiary of the Ford?
If the revisers still have not begun to squirm, here is yet another example.
Say that the same testator, upon losing the ability to drive, replaces the Buick
with a painting of a favorite vacation spot, to which she has frequently driven.
She tells friends that looking at the painting allows her to "visit" that location
despite her inability to drive there anymore. The painting is tangible personal
property that has replaced the Buick. Does the painting pass to the beneficiary of the Ford?
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tion," which in fact reverses the traditional notion of ademption. That "exception" basically converts all adeemed specific
bequests into general bequests of the value of the missing property. Thus, it performs a function exactly opposite to that of
ademption. But because this "exception" begins with "unless
the facts and circumstances indicate that ademption of the devise was intended by the testator or ademption of the devise is
24
consistent with the testator's manifested plan of distribution,"
the revisers nonchalantly claim that it "creates [only] a mild
presumption against ademption." 2s What an understatement.
What the sixth "exception" really does is to tear a longstanding
rule out by the roots and then encourage private litigants to determine whether the old rule applies nonetheless. 26 It is conceivable (but I doubt)2 7 that non-ademption is more in keeping

with the "average" testator's unexpressed intent than ademption. If so, elimination of ademption might be appropriate. But
sowing the seeds of litigation is not.
Until recently, estate planners have been entitled to draft
wills that assumed ademption. In many jurisdictions there
were exceptions, 2 8 and in a few jurisdictions judges had begun
to flirt with the so-called "intent theory of ademption. ' '29 But,
24. 1990 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-606(a)(6).
25. Id § 2-606 cmt.
26. What the revisers propose with respect to ademption thus parallels
Judge Cardozo's demotion of the doctrine of worthier title from a rule of law
to a rule of construction in Doctor v. Hughes, 122 N.E. 221 (N.Y. 1919). Unlike
the revisers in dealing with ademption, Judge Cardozo did not also reverse the
traditional rule; he merely treated it as an issue on which extraneous proof
was relevant. Still, the result was a litigation quagmire. See, e.g., Hatch v.
Riggs Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (considering the continued viability of the doctrine of worthier title); Harold E. Verrall, The Doctrine of
Worthier Title: A Questionable Rule of Construction, 6 UCLA L. REV. 371
(1959) (tracing the transformation of the doctrine in various jurisdictions).
Eventually, reformers came to understand that outright elimination of the
doctrine of worthier title was preferable to requiring private parties to litigate
their own rule on a case-by-case basis. The trend, therefore, seems to be a rejection of the doctrine not only as a rule of law, but also as a rule of construction. See, e.g., 1990 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-710; Hatch, 361 F.2d at 564.
27. See infra pp. 648-49.
28. See, e.g., PRE-1990 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-608.
29. The comment to 1990 UNIF.PROBATE CODE § 2-606 cites only one such
case, Estate of Austin, 169 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1980). In Austin the court did refuse
rigidly to apply the identity theory of ademption, but nothing in the opinion
supports the revisers' drastic changes in the rules relating to ademption. Austin involved a specific bequest of a promissory note secured by a deed of trust.
Shortly after the promisor prepaid the note, the testator reinvested the proceeds in another promissory note secured by another deed of trust. Because a
third party (rather than the testator) "initiate[d]" the action that caused the
disappearance of the specifically bequeathed asset; because the proceeds of the
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in general, ademption reigned supreme. 30 An estate planner
could, therefore, confidently draft a specific bequest and be safe
in the knowledge that if the asset disappeared, the bequest
would, too. Under the 1990 version of the UPC, with its variable result, the competent estate planner who drafts a specific
bequest must in every case add language disposing of the
ademption issue one way or the other. Moreover, any estate
planner who has ever drafted a specific bequest under the now
obsolete assumption that ademption applied must give serious
consideration to asking the client to amend the will to reflect
the client's intention as to ademption. The revisers and I apparently disagree about whether ademption or non-ademption
is the better default rule. Even if the revisers are correct, however, a slightly better rule relating to such a trivial aspect of
the law is not worth reviewing all the wills in this country.
It is no answer to say, as the revisers do in their comments
to their new antilapse statute, that, if a lawyer has relied on the
old rule in response to actual client feedback, the lawyer will
be permitted to testify as to that feedback, and the old result
will prevail.3 ' "The counselor's job is to prevent litigation."3 2
Allowing a client to die with a will that depends on the scrivener's testimony for its effect is a sure-fire way to promote, not
prevent, litigation.
I have yet another bone to pick with the fifth and sixth
"exceptions."
It is obvious that one of the revisers' goals
throughout their work is to "idiot-proof" the UPC. They have
constantly tried to change the UPC in ways that make estate
planning expertise less compulsory for those who plan estates
without regard to their own competence.3 3 In the long run,
however, bending over backwards to preserve specific bequests
may not be "consumer friendly." The lay person trying to
specifically bequeathed asset were "easily traceable" into the replacement asset; and because the replacement asset was "almost identical" to the specifically bequeathed asset, one cannot fairly say that Austin stands for either a
replacement theory of ademption or conversion of all specific bequests of missing assets into general bequests of the value of those assets. See id. at 651.
30. Even the revisers' comment to 1990 UNIF.PROBATE CODE § 2-606 indicates that "most courts" continue to employ the traditional notion of
ademption.
31.

1990 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603 cmt.

32. John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88
HARV. L. REV. 489, 524 (1975).
33. See, e.g., 1990 UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-503 (writings intended as wills
admissible to probate notwithstanding noncompliance with statutory formalities), 2-601 (rules of construction control in absence of "contrary intent," as opposed to "contrary intention indicated by the will").
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write his or her own will, or the client trying to figure out the
meaning of a lawyer-prepared will, ought to have a fighting
chance of getting it right. The uninitiated are unlikely to conclude on their own that "I give my car to Bob" really means "I
give my car to Bob if I still own it at my death or, if I do not
still own my car at my death, I give Bob anything with which I
have replaced my car, or, if I have disposed of my car but not
replaced it, I give Bob cash in the amount of the fair market
value of what was once my car, as of the moment of my death."
These "exceptions" thus make a working knowledge of esoteric
estate planning trivia more, rather than less, essential to understanding words that often appear in wills, no matter who drafts
them. In short, because these "exceptions" veer sharply from
what a lay person would expect a specific bequest to denote,
they place an even higher premium on obtaining competent,
expert assistance. This is not my notion of a "consumerfriendly" change.
One of the easiest errors for the inexperienced or thoughtless estate planner to make is to allow a client to leave so many
preresiduary bequests that little or nothing remains for the residuary beneficiary, who is almost always the testator's overwhelmingly predominant beneficiary (generally a surviving
spouse or issue). Traditional ademption, however unfriendly to
testator intentions in the limited sense that seems to have motivated the revisers, is "consumer-friendly" in the sense that it
serves to limit preresiduary bequests and may, therefore, help
to effectuate the testator's ultimate dispositive goals. By attempting to make it harder to screw up a client's will on a
small matter, the revisers have made it easier to screw up a client's will in a major way. The revisers probably should not
hold their breaths for a congratulatory telegram from Ralph
Nader.
II.

ANTILAPSE STATUTE

One of the most basic of all the rules relating to the testamentary disposition of wealth is lapse. As a general rule, a beneficiary who fails to survive the testator forfeits any bequest
under the testator's will. 4 Lapse does, however, do more than
state the obvious. It also denies the bequest to the dead beneficiary's estate. The consequence of lapse is, therefore, that
someone else takes the property that was the subject of the be34. See generally ATKINSON, supra note 14,
lapse on testamentary gifts).

§

140 (describing the effect of
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quest. "Antilapse" statutes do not change this result and thus
do not fully live up to their name. Instead, antilapse statutes,
when they apply, merely identify the someone else who takes
the bequest in lieu of the dead beneficiary's estate. Rather
than relying on other parts of the will (or the law of intestate
succession), antilapse statutes redirect lapsed bequests to one or
more substitute takers, typically the dead beneficiary's surviving issue.35 Thus, an antilapse statute can "save" a lapsed bequest for certain of a dead beneficiary's successors, rather than
allow the property that is the subject of the bequest to pass,
possibly to different beneficiaries, under different provisions of
the testator's will (e.g., the residuary clause) or by intestate
succession.
The 1990 version of the UPC places a very high value on
antilapse statutes. Not only does the 1990 version extend antilapse rules to areas where their application has heretofore been
uncertain, 36 it also seeks to give the antilapse statute "the widest possible latitude to operate in considering whether in an individual case there is an indication of a contrary intent
sufficiently convincing to defeat the statute. ' '31 Accordingly,
the 1990 version states that words requiring a beneficiary to
survive the testator are insufficient to defeat the operation of
the antilapse statute.3 8 I have strong reservations about this as39
pect of the new antilapse provisions.
35. See Susan F. French, Antilapse Statutes are Blunt Instruments: A
Blueprintfor Reform, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 335, 345, 370 (1985).
36. See 1990 UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-603(a)(4)(iv) (appointments under
testamentary powers), 2-706 (life insurance, retirement plans, POD accounts,
etc.), 2-707 (future interests).
37. Id § 2-603 cmt.
38. Id § 2-603(b)(3).
39. The revisers' comment to the 1990 version of the UPC's antilapse statute quotes Professor French: "Courts have tended to accord too much significance to survival requirements when deciding whether to apply antilapse
statutes." Id. § 2-603 cmt. (quoting French, supra note 35, at 369). But the
comment offers as its sole reason for denying preclusive effect to words requiring survival that the statute is "remedial in nature, tending to preserve equality of treatment among different lines of succession." Id One of the most
important reasons for allowing decedents to dispose of their property by will is
to free them from the unwanted obligation to leave their property equally
among various lines of succession. Enforced equality of treatment may be an
appropriate result under an intestate succession statute, but it is an appropriate result under a will only if the testator desires it. Professor French's article
is, indeed, a virtuoso performance. But I disagree with several of her recommendations, particularly those relating to the effect of words requiring survival. Those recommendations often seem more effective in enforcing equality
of distribution among family lines than in implementing a particular testator's
intent. Even so, the 1990 version of the UPC goes well beyond Professor

1990 REVISIONS TO THE UPC

1993]

Everyone recognizes that a testator should be able to formulate a dispositive scheme and implement it without interference from the antilapse statute. In other words, everyone
agrees that a testator ought to be able to leave a bequest that
does not pass to the substitute takers specified in the antilapse
statute if the beneficiary does not survive the testator. Under
most estate planners' understanding of current law, all it takes
to "defeat" the antilapse statute is that the terms of a bequest
require survival of the beneficiary. 40 (Throughout the rest of
this essay, I shall refer to this understanding as "the rule.")
Specifically, most estate planners believe that if a bequest contains language such as, "if he survives me," the antilapse statute cannot apply. Other portions of the will (or the law of
intestate succession), rather than the antilapse statute, will determine what happens to the property that is the subject of a
bequest if the beneficiary predeceases the testator. Thus, every
day, good lawyers all around the country draft wills under the
assumption that, so long as they condition each bequest on the
beneficiary's survival of the testator, the antilapse statute is
inapplicable.
The 1990 version of the UPC changes all this. The 1990
version, which requires more in the way of establishing that the
testator intended for the statute not to apply, rejects the rule
out of hand.41 As in the case of ademption, therefore, the revisFrench's recommendations. She recommends that words requiring survival
continue to have nearly preclusive effect with respect to all bequests except
bequests to issue. French, supra note 35, at 372-73. Even as to bequests to
issue, words requiring survival would have nearly preclusive effect unless "the
result of lapse would be to disinherit a branch of the testator's lineal descendants." Id. Professor French's recommendations are thus far more sophisticated than the revisers' new blunt instrument.
40. The revisers dispute this assertion in part. They state that "lawyers
who believe that... attachment of words of survivorship to a devise is a foolproof method of defeating an antilapse statue [sic] are mistaken." 1990 UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-603 cmt. But they cite only three cases, see infra note 44,
two of which are readily distinguishable, see description of cases infra note 44,
and one of which probably is not the law even in the state in which it was decided, see infra note 45.
41.

1990 UNi.

PROBATE CODE § 2-603(b)(3).

The revisers offer three

"foolproof means of expressing a contrary intention." Id. § 2-603 cmt. The
first of these techniques, adding "and not to [the devisee's] descendants" to the
words conferring the bequest, is hardly a standard drafting technique. Cf. THE
NORTHERN TRUST COMPANY OF ARIZONA, WILL AND TRUST FORMs 110-0 (4th
ed. 1984) ("I devise... $5,000 to my sister, JANE DOE, of Phoenix, Arizona, if
she survives me."). Another of these techniques, adding "including all lapsed
or failed devises" to the residuary clause, does have some current acceptance.
Cf. id. at 110-3. But that technique obviously works only with respect to
lapsed preresiduary bequests. The third of the suggested techniques, adding "a
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ers have chosen to stand on its head an established rule upon
which those who draft wills must and should be able safely to
rely. This situation is bad enough, for it forces reconsideration
of almost all outstanding wills. But here, as in the case of
ademption, the 1990 version of the UPC does not simply reverse the old rule; rather, it demands the introduction of "additional evidence" of the testator's intent before it will allow
words of survivorship to defeat the antilapse statute.42 Thus,
here, too, the 1990 version does not just require the review of
already completed documents; it also forces private parties to
engage in litigation to determine whether the antilapse statute
applies on a particular set of facts. In short, the revisers' handling of the rule is subject to many of the same criticisms I
have already leveled against their handling of ademption.
The revisers' handling of the rule raises an additional,
more troubling issue. It is difficult to avoid concluding that the
revisers look down their noses at estate planners who rely on
the rule. They seem to think that these estate planners simply
do not know what they are doing.4 3 The revisers cite three
cases that, to one extent or another, adversely affect the rule.44
To suggest, however, that reliance on a rule is unjustified unless every relevant case fully squares with it is to require more
consistency than our legal system is capable of sustaining.
Some cases are simply wrong, and we ought to be willing to label them as such.4 5 Generally, antilapse statutes apply only if
separate clause stating that all lapsed or failed nonresiduary devises are to

pass under the residuary clause," also seems not to be widely used and, in any
event, works only with respect to lapsed preresiduary bequests.
42. 1990 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603(b)(3).
43. "Lawyers who believe that the attachment of words of survivorship to
a devise is a foolproof method of defeating an antilapse statue [sic] are mistaken." I& § 2-603 cmt.
44. Henderson v. Parker, 728 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1987) (court construed language in joint will disposing of property among "surviving children of this
marriage" as "merely a general statement clarified by the more specific disposition which follow[ed and did not require survival]"); Estate of Ulrikson, 290
N.W.2d 757 (Minn. 1980) (en banc) (will contained language dealing with contingency that one beneficiary would predecease the other but said nothing
about what was to happen if both predeceased the testator; thus, the court
found that the will "contain[ed] no instructions for the circumstances which
occurred"); Detzel v. Nieberding, 219 N.E.2d 327 (P. Ct. Hamilton County,
Ohio 1966). French, supranote 35, at 347 n.67, cites a few more cases.
45. One Ohio judge has referred to Detzel v. Nieberding as "clearly and
completely erroneous." Shalkhauser v. Beach, 233 N.E.2d 527, 530 (P. Ct.
Cuyahoga County, Ohio 1968) (Decatur, Ref.). Another has expressly distinguished it. Day v. Brooks, 224 N.E.2d 557, 566 (P. Ct. Cuyahoga County, Ohio
1967) (Andrews, C.Ref.). Moreover, it is Shalkhauser v. Beach, rather than
Detzel v. Nieberding,that appears to be the law in Ohio. See Tootle v. Tootle,
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the testator's will fails to evidence a "contrary intention."4
The cases on which the revisers rely are simply bad interpretations of statutes that incompletely answer the question, "What
does it take to defeat the antilapse statute?" Thus, these cases
do little more than illustrate the fact that antilapse statutes (including the antilapse statute under the pre-1990 version of the
UPC) typically have not been crystal-clear in describing what it
takes to render them inapplicable. I agree wholeheartedly that
the UPC should be crystal-clear on this issue. But I part with
the revisers in rejecting the rule. In doing so, they are throwing the baby out with the bath water. Even worse, after discarding the baby, they have failed to deliver a workable
replacement.
It would have been a simple matter to make the UPC crystal-clear on what it takes to render the antilapse statute inapplicable. The revisers could have done so simply by stating that
words of survivorship are sufficient to indicate an intent to
render the antilapse statute inapplicable. They chose not to.
Instead, they rejected the rule in general terms but left the issue open to proof in individual cases.4 7 As a result, the actual
effect of the 1990 revisions is that the rule no longer applies,
unless litigation determines that it does.
Even one who views the stray cases upon which the revisers rely as more than just "wrong" must admit that the 1990 revisions offer testators and their lawyers and beneficiaries a
much less clear environment in which to operate. The old rule
worked, other than in the exceptional case when litigation occurred. Even in those cases, the result was usually enforcement of the rule. 48 Under the 1990 revisions, any bequest
conditioned on survival is statutorily ambiguous until litigation
determines its meaning (unless an effective alternate bequest
immediately follows the bequest). 49 Thus, the new UPC makes
490 N.E.2d 878 (Ohio 1986) (citing Shalkhauser favorably); Cowgill v. Faulconer, 385 N.E.2d 327 (C.P. Prob. Div. Highland County, Ohio 1978) (applying
Shalkhauser). Similarly, Professor French has labelled the result in Estate of
Ulrikson as "unjust." French, supra note 35, at 354. I would have expected
that the revisers would have presented substantially stronger precedents to
support a change in a rule upon which all estate planners must rely daily.

46. See, e.g., PRE-1990 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603.
47. 1990 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603(b)(3).
48. See French, supra note 35, at 347 n.67. Even the revisers' comment to

1990 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603, citing primarily A.L.R. annotations, admits
that "many cases hold that mere words of survivorship do automatically defeat
the antilapse statute."

49. See 1990 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603(b)(3)-(4).
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litigation the rule, rather than the exception. The fact that the
old rule has governed the drafting of the wills of several generations of testators who are still alive means, with certainty, that
bequests conditioned on survival will continue to occur with
great frequency for years to come. The fact that several generations of lawyers have learned to draft wills in reliance on the
rule means, with almost equal certainty, that in the future
there will be even more wills containing bequests conditioned
on survival.
The revisers' rejection of the most obvious solution to the
problem of a few stray cases-i.e., to state unequivocally that
those cases are wrong-suggests that the revisers' real motive
was not simply to restore order, but to reverse the rule itself.
Apparently, the revisers believe their own antilapse provisions
are likely to reflect any particular testator's intent more faithfully than the testator's own will. This conclusion is not only
pretentious, it disputes what should be obvious-that most testators expect their wills to dispose of their property completely 5Q-without interference from a statute of which they
have never even heard. 51 Instead of allowing "if he survives
me" to mean what almost everyone would expect it to mean,
the revisers have translated it into, "if he survives me, and, if
50. See PRE-1990 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-604 ("A will is construed to
pass all property which the testator owns at his death.. . ."). It is interesting

to note that the revisers' replacement for this provision neatly avoids conveying this message. See 1990 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-602 ("A will may provide
for the passage of all property the testator owns at death .... ).
51. This is, of course, the effect every time the antilapse statute applies.
But applying the statute to a bequest "to Bob" is much less pretentious than
applying the statute to a bequest "to Bob if he survives me." The first of these
bequests provides no evidence that either the testator or the scrivener has contemplated the possibility that Bob might predecease the testator. In all likelihood, that thought never entered either's head. Thus, application of the
statute is in no way inconsistent with the will and may, in fact, more accurately capture what the testator would have wanted had he or she considered
the issue than to allow the property to pass under another part of the will or
by intestate succession. The second of the these bequests, however, provides
unmistakable evidence that someone (either the testator, the scrivener, or the
author of a form book) has considered the possibility that Bob might predecease the testator. Moreover, the second bequest expressly denies the bequest
to Bob's estate. Since the takers of an estate, in many instances, consist primarily or even exclusively of the decedent's issue, allowing the antilapse statute to save the second bequest for Bob's issue is, at least to some extent,
deliberately inconsistent with the terms of the will. Applying the statute to
the second bequest in the name of more faithfully carrying out the testator's
intention thus implies that the statute more accurately reflects the testator's
intentions than the testator's own will, with respect to a highly analogous
issue.

1993]

1990 REVISIONS TO THE UPC

he does not survive me, to his issue who survive me." For
those unfamiliar with estate planning esoterica, therefore, it
has become yet more difficult to figure out what the words in a
will actually mean. The uninitiated apparently have three options: hire a competent estate planner, go to law school, or curl
up with Alice in Wonderland.
An even greater form of arrogance lies behind the notion
that rote statutory takers are more in keeping with a testator's
wishes than those the testator's own will specifies. The revisers
apparently believe they can capture the testator's intention as
to whether the antilapse statute should apply to a given lapsed
bequest more accurately than the testator's own estate planner.52 This is absurd. The competent estate planner generally
attaches a condition of survival to each and every bequest. He
or she also constantly takes into account what happens to each
bequest if the conditions to which it is subject do not occur. If
it is the client's wish that a particular preresiduary bequest pass
to a specific alternate taker, there is nothing more natural than
immediately to draft an alternate bequest. But if the client's
desire to leave a specific or general bequest relates primarily to
a particular beneficiary, it is equally natural for the lapsed bequest to "fall into the residuary." Based on my own experience
as an estate planner, I can say with certainty that estate planners, in general, are not oblivious to their clients' wishes regarding the survival of preresiduary bequests. In any event,
motivating estate planners to add more standardized gobbledegook to their residuary clauses, 53 or to standardize separate clauses containing that gobbledegook,M is extremely
unlikely either to make estate planners more sensitive to their
clients' wishes on these issues or to make it easier for clients to
ascertain their documents' meaning under circumstances they
generally do not even care to envision.
Is it different with respect to residuary bequests? Here,
52. Professor French admits that, if a testator's spouse has children by another, the testator's estate planner may be in a better position than the antilapse statute to determine the testator's intention as to the disposition of a
lapsed bequest to that spouse. French, supra note 35, at 359. The apparent
implication is that in many other situations, the antilapse statute is a better
judge of the testator's intent than the testator's own estate planner.
53. The revisers suggest that one "foolproof means of expressing a contrary intention" is to add to the residuary clause the phrase, "including all
lapsed or failed devises." 1990 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603 cmt.
54. Another of the revisers' "foolproof means of expressing a contrary intention" is to add a separate clause "stating that all lapsed or failed
nonresiduary devises are to pass under the residuary clause." Id.
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too, the competent estate planner almost always requires survival. But, in general, the manner in which the competent estate planner requires survival carries out, rather than
frustrates, the client's wishes, even as handed down by the revisers. Typically, there are two types of residuary beneficiaries:
spouses and issue. It is the truly exceptional testator who
wants a bequest to a predeceased spouse to pass to the spouse's
issue, rather than to the testator's own.55 Even the 1990 revisions decline to extend the antilapse statute that far.56 Bequests to issue, then, are at the heart of this debate. The
revisers, however, have excluded from the operation of the 1990
57
antilapse statute most well-drafted bequests to issue as well.
The competent estate planner's residuary clauses make
generous use of "to my issue who survive me, per stirpes," or
one of the currently more fashionable variants.58 Though requiring survival, such a formulation does exactly what the antilapse statute would do-assure equality of treatment among the
various lines of succession. Importantly, however, the competent estate planner, unlike the 1990 statute, limits this equality
of treatment to those situations where the client wants it-typically, in the residuary bequest and in only certain of the preresiduary bequests. The 1990 revisions have instead made
equality of treatment the general rule. The 1990 revisions have
therefore offered a solution to a problem that does not exist in
59
competently drafted wills.
For wills not written by competent estate planners, it may
be (though I doubt) 60 that the revisers are correct in secondguessing automatic application of the rule. Even if the revisers
have accurately divined the intent of testators whose wills are
not drafted by competent estate planners, however, the revisers
55. See French, supra note 35, at 357-59.
56. See 1990 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603(b) (gifts to spouse not included
in statute).
57. I& § 2-603(b)(2).
58. See Raymond H. Young, Meaning of "Issue" and "Descendants," 13
ACPC PROB. NOTES 225 (1988); cf. 1990 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-106 (per capita system of representation at each generation for purposes of intestate
succession).
59. Professor French seems to admit all this. She writes, "Proper testamentary planning and drafting to provide alternative takers can avoid the
problem, but not all lawyers are careful drafters and not all testators consult
lawyers." French, supra note 35, at 337. She also identifies an antilapse statute's "true function" as "providing a supplemental disposition of property for
the testator too careless or too ill-advised to have drawn a complete and unambiguous will." rd. at 374.
60. See supra pp. 651-52.
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have gone much too far in trying to effectuate that intent.
They propose to effectuate an unexpressed intent at the expense of those who have done everything possible to express
their own intent clearly.
Those who hire competent estate planners to formulate
wills ought not endlessly receive recall notices. Wills need revision often enough in response to changes in family life. The
legislature ought not require revision for such a tiny improvement in faithfulness to the presumed intent of those who have
hired no one or no one competent to write their wills. Our statutes should undoubtedly be more "consumer friendly." They
should not, however, in the name of an infinitesimal improvement in "consumer friendliness," penalize those who have already paid a high price in time and money to make the current
system work.
CONCLUSION
Estate planners must constantly revise their clients' wills
to take into account not only changes in family life but also
Congress's most recent revisions to the Internal Revenue Code.
Many of us see the latter as never-ending and often misguided.
But the changes Congress makes can be extremely important. 6 '
In comparison, both of the UPC changes this essay discusses
are trivial. Conceivably, in some circumstances, some of the revisers' assumptions may be better than those underlying the existing rules. But both changes reverse rules that have governed
the drafting of almost every will currently in existence. The
tiny improvement in faithfulness to the unexpressed testatorial
intent of those who cannot or will not hire a competent estate
planner is simply not worth reviewing all currently outstanding
wills to determine whether revision is necessary.
In all likelihood, these new rules frustrate, rather than fur61.

For example, in 1981, when Congress bloated the unified credit, see

Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 401(a)(2)(A), 95 Stat.
172, 299 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 2010(b) (1988)) (amending § 2010 to
increase the credit equivalent to $225,000 in 1982 and providing for further annual increases through 1987, when the credit equivalent reached $600,000), and
removed all quantitative restrictions, see Economic Recovery Tax Act
§ 403(a)(1), 95 Stat. at 301 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 2056 (a), (c) (1988)),
as well as a crucial qualitative restriction on the marital deduction, see Economic Recovery Tax Act § 403(d)(1), 95 Stat. at 302-03 (current version at

I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7), (8) (1988 & Supp. II 1990)), it was clear that Congress had
intended to revolutionize estate planning. That the wills of virtually all married couples needed revision as a result seemed exactly what Congress had in

mind.
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ther, the unexpressed intent of the "average" testator. There
seems to be general agreement with the proposition that, whenever possible, the law should give words the same meaning lay
people attribute to them. These changes, however, give the
UPC a language all its own. In rejecting ademption, the revisers are forcing estate planners to interpret "I give my car to
Bob" as "I give my car to Bob if I still own it at my death or, if
I do not still own my car at my death, I give Bob anything with
which I have replaced my car, or, if I have disposed of my car
but not replaced it, I give Bob cash in the amount of the fair
market value of what was once my car, as of the moment of my
death." Obviously, the words say nothing of the sort. So how
can the revisers claim that their interpretation is more faithful
to the unexpressed intent of the "average" testator? Similarly,
by rejecting the understanding, commonly held among estate
planners, that words of survival render the antilapse statute inapplicable, the revisers force estate planners to interpret "to
Bob if he survives me" as "to Bob if he survives me or, if he
does not, to his issue who survive me." Here again, the words
themselves say very much less. Just how is the "average" testator supposed to figure out the revisers' intent? Alice in Wonderland is an amusing little tale, but I do not believe that the
Red Queen's use of language is helpful in revising the UPC.
Why can't words mean for estate planning purposes exactly
what most people think they mean?
The 1990 version of the UPC seems to have a distinctly different agenda for reform than the pre-1990 version. The pre1990 version was easy to understand and apply, minimized the
importance of estate planning esoterica in understanding estate
planning documents, and avoided litigation whenever possible.
The 1990 version appears to have allowed another goal to dilute, if not supersede, these objectives. The 1990 goal of greater
statutory faithfulness to what the revisers imagine is the "average" testator's unexpressed intent has swamped these pre-1990
objectives and led instead to wordiness, complexity, heightened
significance for estate planning esoterica, and increased reliance on litigation. As a result of the 1990 revisions, the UPC
has, therefore, come, in several distasteful respects, to resemble
the Internal Revenue Code.

